[tor-bugs] #15482 [Tor]: Don't surprise users with new circuits in the middle of browsing
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Sep 1 18:19:00 UTC 2015
#15482: Don't surprise users with new circuits in the middle of browsing
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Reporter: | Owner: yawning
mikeperry | Status: needs_revision
Type: | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
enhancement | Version: Tor: unspecified
Priority: normal | Keywords: tbb-usability, tbb-wants, tor-core,
Component: Tor | PostFreeze027, TorCoreTeam201509
Resolution: | Parent ID:
Actual Points: |
Points: |
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Comment (by nickm):
Oh, and I'm not sure it's right to ditch the randomness here either; I
think it helps. (Rationale: in unpatched Tor, any adversary on the
circuit can only learn, from the circuit close time, that the circuit is
finally used for no streams, *and* that the time at which the first stream
was attached to the circuit. But this is trivial for them to infer from
traffic patterns anyway. With this patch, such an adversary can also
learn a latest-bound for the time at which the last stream opened, which
wasn't visible to them before unless the streams are pretty isolated in
time. I don't know if we should be worrying about this or not, but it
deserve's a moment's contemplation IMO)
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15482#comment:38>
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