[tor-bugs] #17254 [Tor]: Scalable HSes by splitting intro/rendezvous

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#17254: Scalable HSes by splitting intro/rendezvous
-------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  TvdW         |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium       |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Tor          |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal       |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs       |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:               |         Points:  medium
  Sponsor:  SponsorR     |
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Changes (by nickm):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Comments on the spec branch:
    * I still think "INTRODUCE" is a pretty vague name. How about
 INTRODUCE_HANDOFF?
    * I really don't like sending private keys around like this.  Is there
 any way to avoid it?

 Comments on the code's documentation:
    * I still believe you should specify the _actual_ contents and format
 of the blob. rend_service_handoff_introduce has this information, but only
 sort of.
    * Actually, rend_service_handoff_introduce's generation and parsing
 code is the kind of thing I made Trunnel for.  Here is a trunnel
 specification that would let you get rid of 90% of the code for generating
 and parsing these:
 {{{
 struct introduction_v0 {
    nulterm tor_version;
    u32 request_len;
    u8 request[request_len];
    u8 rend_pk_digest[20];
    u8 rsa_private_key[..];
  };
 }}}

 Though personally I would suggest something more like this instead:
 {{{
 struct introduction_v0 {
    u16 blob_version IN [0];
    u16 request_len;
    u8 request[request_len];
    u8 rend_pk_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
    u8 rsa_privkey_len;
    u8 rsa_privkey[rsa_privkey_len];
 };
 }}}

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17254#comment:8>
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