[tor-bugs] #15254 [Tor]: Enable hidden-service statistics by default

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Oct 13 00:56:47 UTC 2015


#15254: Enable hidden-service statistics by default
-----------------------------+--------------------------------
     Reporter:  dgoulet      |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  reopened
     Priority:  major        |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:  tor-hs, stats
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |    Sponsor:  SponsorR
-----------------------------+--------------------------------

Comment (by asn):

 Hello,

 I prepared some data sets that might help us gauge how realistic the
 attacks described above are. I'm talking specifically about the ricochet
 signal detection of comment:28, and the inactive relay infoleak of
 comment:18 .

 Here is a list of measurements per date of September 2015:
 https://people.torproject.org/~asn/statsattack/hs_stats_per_date.txt
 For example you can see that on the 20th we received 74 reports with HS
 stats. One of those relays reported 25504922 rendezvous cells passing
 through it. We could use this data set to evaluate how likely it is to
 distinguish signals of various size when we consider the whole Tor network
 reporting such stats

 Here is a list of measurements that each relay reported during September
 2015:
 https://people.torproject.org/~asn/statsattack/hs_stats_per_relay.txt
 For example, the relay AlBasala did 21 measurements during September. It
 might be of interest to see how its measurements changed over time. We
 could use this dataset to find weak relays and see what kind of data is
 produced.

 Of course, this is just a restricted set and it does not represent the
 full reality, but it might help us understand more this problem.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15254#comment:33>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online


More information about the tor-bugs mailing list