[tor-bugs] #17694 [Tor]: Hash PRNG output before use, so that it's not revealed to the network

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#17694: Hash PRNG output before use, so that it's not revealed to the network
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 Reporter:  teor         |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium       |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Tor          |        Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal       |     Resolution:
 Keywords:               |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:               |         Points:
  Sponsor:               |
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Comment (by nickm):

 FWIW, though I don't generally object to belt-and-suspenders engineering,
 I'm not 100% sure of this approach; if we think there's any chance that
 future outputs of our PRNG can be predicted from our past PRNG outputs, we
 should probably throw away the PRNG and use a good one, right?  (Or for
 that matter, we should revise openssl to stop exposing PRNG outputs in
 that case too.)

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17694#comment:1>
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