[tor-bugs] #17686 [Tor]: Make our openssl-RNG calling code less scary.

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#17686: Make our openssl-RNG calling code less scary.
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 Reporter:  nickm       |          Owner:
     Type:  defect      |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium      |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Tor         |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal      |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  rng crypto  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:              |         Points:
  Sponsor:              |
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Comment (by yawning):

 Signing off on the "not actually a security bug" bit, at least with all 4
 of the latest OpenSSL release branches and master.

 A few more thoughts, while we're messing with this code (may deserve
 separate tickets?):
  * `crypto_strongest_rand()` could/should use getrandom/getentropy when
 available.
  * If we trust in libottery(-lite), we could fold it in and have OpenSSL
 use that as the RAND method.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17686#comment:1>
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