[tor-bugs] #17358 [Tor]: Decide what options to disable with Single Onion Services

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Mon Nov 16 23:27:17 UTC 2015


#17358: Decide what options to disable with Single Onion Services
-------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  teor         |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium       |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Tor          |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal       |     Resolution:
 Keywords:               |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17178       |         Points:
  Sponsor:               |
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Comment (by teor):

 Open questions:

 Do we want to recommend a value for CircuitBuildTimeout?
 The default is 60 seconds.

 Do we want to recommend a value for CircuitIdleTimeout? (The timeout for
 unused circuits.)
 The default is 1 hour, but if operators set RendPostPeriod to 10 minutes,
 they could make it 21 minutes, as the only predicted circuits Tor uses are
 for descriptor posting:
 * when the descriptor becomes dirty (or on startup), and
 * a random time between 0 and 2*RendPostPeriod later

 I don't think that setting any of the performance options in the proposal
 is necessary, but we should update the manual page RSOS option so it
 mentions them.

 asn tells me that the security recommendations are unnecessary, we already
 warn users not to run a relay or client with their onion service.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17358#comment:1>
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