[tor-bugs] #17580 [Tor Messenger]: Add IPC for client so other programs can import/export messages

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#17580: Add IPC for client so other programs can import/export messages
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     Reporter:  maqp           |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement    |     Status:  new
     Priority:  Medium         |  Milestone:
    Component:  Tor Messenger  |    Version:
     Severity:  Normal         |   Keywords:  end point security TFC CNE
Actual Points:                 |  Parent ID:
       Points:                 |    Sponsor:
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 Hi!

 I'm working on a project that provides end point security against bulk CNE
 / bulk equipment interference / automated hacking by limiting the window
 of exposure during which end point can be compromised.

 Currently, a software exploit that finds it's way to computer of user at
 _any point_ after setup can compromise all future conversations. With TFC,
 if the system isn't compromised during the ~10 minute time frame of setup,
 it will remain secure against remote attacks, even if the malware would
 exploit zero days in software / OS. Only malware that exploits unintended
 covert channel in hardware is able to retrieve the information.

 --------

 Abstract


 Tinfoil Chat (TFC) is a high assurance encryption system that operates on
 top of messaging clients.  Built on free and open source hardware and
 software the secure by design implementa tion protects not only data in
 transit against passive and active attacks, but also the end points
 against CNE practiced by organized crime and TLAs such as the NSA, GCHQ
 and BKA.

 1.  Authenticated encryption uses either OTP and one-time MAC, or cascaded
 set of symmetric ciphers (Keccak-512-CTR, XSalsa20, Twofish-CTR and
 AES256-GCM) and set of authentication algorithms (GMAC, HMAC-SHA2-512 and
 SHA3-512 MAC).

 2.  Keys are generated by mixing /dev/(u)random with vN whitened, SHA3-512
 compressed entropy, sampled from an open circuit design HWRNG.

 3.  Endpoints are secured by separating encryption and decryption on
 isolated TCB-devices, that interact with a networked computer through open
 circuit design data-diode enforced unidirectional gateways.  Removal of
 bidirectional channels prevents exfiltration of keys and plaintexts even
 with exploits against zero-day vulnerabilities in software against OS of
 TCBs.

 4.  Trickle connection hides metadata about when and how much
 communication is taking place by sending a constant stream of encrypted
 data to receiving TCB units.

 -----

 Links


 Whitepaper:
 https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/oottela/tfc.pdf

 User manual:
 https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/oottela/tfc-manual.pdf

 GitHub project:
 https://github.com/maqp/tfc-cev


 At the moment TFC works wonderfully with Pidgin, but I would assume Tor
 Messenger is going to replace it in Tails at some point, which would
 render TFC's Tails installation configuration useless.

 So I'm asking you to include some sort of IPC that let's other programs
 read and write messages to Tor Messenger client.

 I'm happy to answer any questions you might have regarding the project or
 the issue.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17580>
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