[tor-bugs] #17549 [Tor]: tortls.c compile error w/Tor v0.2.8.0-alpha-dev and OpenSSL 1.1.0-dev (git-19e10f95c105a698) against SSL_Dev

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Nov 10 14:19:41 UTC 2015


#17549: tortls.c compile error w/Tor v0.2.8.0-alpha-dev and OpenSSL 1.1.0-dev (git-
19e10f95c105a698) against SSL_Dev
---------------------------------------------+-----------------------------
 Reporter:  yancm                            |          Owner:
     Type:  defect                           |         Status:
 Priority:  Medium                           |  needs_revision
Component:  Tor                              |      Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal                           |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  tor-core, openssl, 027-backport  |        Version:  Tor:
Parent ID:                                   |  unspecified
  Sponsor:                                   |     Resolution:
                                             |  Actual Points:
                                             |         Points:
---------------------------------------------+-----------------------------
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Looks good, but I bet this will break with libressl.  That's not _too_
 horrible to do in an alpha, but we should avoid it if we can.

 Also, hmm.  I generally think it's better to make #ifdefs not be small
 pieces of functions, but rather independent functions.  So what if instead
 we do something like
 {{{
 #if (it's an old version)
 #define OpenSSL_version_num() SSLeay()
 #define OpenSSL_version(v) SSLeay_version(v)
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
 ...
 #endif
 }}}
 and then our functions can stay nice and pretty?

 > I'm getting tempted to start saying that chasing OpenSSL 1.1.0-dev is at
 people's own risk, and they should be prepared to patch trivial issues
 like this.

 Well, I'll be a bit more moderate, but basically agree: It's cool if
 somebody wants to run openssl-1.1.0-dev, but they should expect it to
 break Tor pretty frequently, and they should expect that we'll fix this
 kind of issue as we get around to it and no sooner.  Otherwise we couldn't
 try to keep up with this as all.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17549#comment:5>
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