[tor-bugs] #16943 [Tor]: Implement prop250 (Random Number Generation During Tor Voting)

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Nov 10 12:21:17 UTC 2015


#16943: Implement prop250 (Random Number Generation During Tor Voting)
----------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  asn       |          Owner:
     Type:  defect    |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium    |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Tor       |        Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   |     Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs    |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #8244     |         Points:  large
  Sponsor:  SponsorR  |
----------------------+------------------------------------

Comment (by asn):

 OK, here is the latest state of the game here.

 In my torspec branch `prop250-nosrkeys-v2` you can find prop250 without
 the SR keys as discussed here: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 dev/2015-November/009875.html

 In my tor branch `prop250-nosrkeys-day1` you can find the corresponding
 code, where we use the ed25519 master key for referencing, and the RSA
 identity key to detect multiple commits by a single authority. I also
 fixed the `get_state_valid_until_time()` function and wrote some
 unittests.

 I think the next step in our simplification process here is to refactor
 the `decide()` step which is not really useful anymore now that we don't
 do majority or conflicts. I imagine that we could make it so that there is
 no decide step or `voted_commits`, and we just move valid authoritative
 commits directly to the sr state during vote parsing.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16943#comment:13>
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