[tor-bugs] #16062 [Tor]: Pseudonymous bidirectional user/caller authentication (true P2P)

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Mon May 18 13:21:36 UTC 2015


#16062: Pseudonymous bidirectional user/caller authentication (true P2P)
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     Reporter:  vynX         |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal       |  Milestone:
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
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Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:1 ioerror]:

 (snip)

 > > From my humble understanding of the Tor architecture, only two changes
 are needed:
 > > – An API for apps and users to classify the interaction with certain
 onions as pseudonymous rather than anonymous.
 >
 > If you want that - you can give a client an authorized hidden service -
 the .onion and the token are unique per user. In addition, you can use the
 stealth (rather than basic) mode for a higher level of security (at a
 cost).
 >
 > > – An API for hidden services to access the pseudonymous authentication
 data when provided.
 >
 > You can use SETCONF to generate hidden services on the fly. I believe
 you can use that to generate hidden services that require authentication.
 Either way, the higher level application needs to talk to the Tor
 Controller, I think. I believe that the Tor Controller will tell you that
 you have an incoming connection from user alice and then you can patch
 that data to your higher level application.

 The relevant tickets for this functionality would be #15588 and #16059.
 I'm tempted to not-a-bug this because the 2 tickets would cover everything
 in this ticket, but as usual, others are free to disagree with me.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16062#comment:2>
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