[tor-bugs] #13670 [Tor Browser]: ensure OCSP & favicons respect URL bar domain isolation

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue May 12 15:39:26 UTC 2015


#13670: ensure OCSP & favicons respect URL bar domain isolation
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
     Reporter:           |      Owner:  arthuredelstein
  arthuredelstein        |     Status:  needs_revision
         Type:  defect   |  Milestone:
     Priority:  major    |    Version:
    Component:  Tor      |   Keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff38-esr,
  Browser                |  TorBrowserTeam201505R, MikePerry201505R
   Resolution:           |  Parent ID:
Actual Points:           |
       Points:           |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Comment (by mcs):

 Kathy and I did our best to review these patches.  We are not 100% sure,
 but it seems like the change Mike made to use a hostname for isolationKey
 will break the code inside nsHTTPDownloadEvent::Run() that passes that
 string to NS_NewURI().  It would be good to add a check for failure there
 in any case.

 With respect to memory ownership and lifetime issues, it is difficult to
 be certain but Kathy and I think the code is OK.  From an auditability
 point of view, using string classes would make things easier.

 A few more comments:
 - The GUID for nsISocketTransport.idl should be updated.
 - The second parameter to ReportFailedToProcess() is always an empty
 string.  Why add the parameter?
 - Inside TransportSecurityInfo, the getter that has this signature is not
 called:

   `nsresult GetIsolationKey(char **aIsolationKey);`

 Can we remove it?  Also, it might be good to follow the example of
 GetHostNameRaw() and rename the other GetIsolationKey() method to
 GetIsolationKeyRaw().

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13670#comment:38>
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