[tor-bugs] #12389 [Tor]: Should we warn when exit nodes are using opendns or google dns?

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#12389: Should we warn when exit nodes are using opendns or google dns?
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     Reporter:  nickm   |      Owner:
         Type:  defect  |     Status:  needs_review
     Priority:  normal  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
    Component:  Tor     |    Version:
   Resolution:          |   Keywords:  tor-relay 026-triaged-1
Actual Points:          |  Parent ID:
       Points:          |
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Comment (by Sebastian):

 I think we shouldn't implement this. I think Google DNS for many people is
 a sane choice, saner than what their ISP provides by default. Warning
 people off of it might not make them provide better service as exit
 relays. It surely is a tradeoff, but in other instances we're happy with
 the tradeoff (think meek - your bridge is a cdn, just like all the
 websites you fetch).

 Which DNS server to pick is an operational choice by the relay operator,
 and we don't like telling people what to do in general unless we have a
 very good reason for it or have a policy on that such behaviour is clearly
 bad (like modifying content, for example). Why do we pick opendns and
 google here? Are there others we should pick? Why do we get to decide who
 is scary and who is not? A counterargument to this is that most people
 probably don't think about their dns provider at all, so we have a chance
 to reach them.

 I think such a recommendation is best worded as a recommendation with
 evidence, maybe a blog post or tor-relays posting. Embedding a warning
 like that into tor makes it - to me - an official torproject policy saying
 "google dns is bad".

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12389#comment:5>
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