[tor-bugs] #16659 [- Select a component]: TCP Initial Sequence Numbers Leak Host Clock

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#16659: TCP Initial Sequence Numbers Leak Host Clock
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     Reporter:  source                |      Owner:
         Type:  defect                |     Status:  closed
     Priority:  normal                |  Milestone:
    Component:  - Select a component  |    Version:
   Resolution:  not a bug             |   Keywords:
Actual Points:                        |  Parent ID:
       Points:                        |
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Comment (by mikeperry):

 FTR, I think is is worth complaining to the kernel developers for the
 simple reason that adding the 64ns timer post-hash probably *does* leak
 side channels about CPU activity, and that may prove very dangerous for
 long-running cryptographic operations (along the lines of the hot-or-not
 issue). Unfortunately, someone probably needs to produce more research
 papers before they will listen.

 As far as this ticket goes, though, I agree with the NAB right now,
 because the ISN does not appear to leak the host clock due to the 32bit
 truncation of 64ns ticks.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16659#comment:10>
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