[tor-bugs] #17773 [Tor]: Should clients avoid using guards that lost the Guard flag?

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Dec 17 05:41:07 UTC 2015


#17773: Should clients avoid using guards that lost the Guard flag?
-------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  arma         |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium       |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Tor          |        Version:
 Severity:  Normal       |     Resolution:
 Keywords:               |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:               |         Points:
  Sponsor:               |
-------------------------+------------------------------------

Comment (by teor):

 I think entry_guards_set_from_config() already does something useful - it
 places entry nodes without the Guard flag after entry nodes with the Guard
 flag:
 {{{
     } else if (! node->is_possible_guard) {
       smartlist_add(worse_entry_nodes, (node_t*)node);
       SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
     }
   } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);

   /* Now build the new entry_guards list. */
   smartlist_clear(entry_guards);
   /* First, the previously configured guards that are in EntryNodes. */
   smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_on_list);
   /* Next, scramble the rest of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */
   smartlist_shuffle(entry_nodes);
   smartlist_shuffle(worse_entry_nodes);
   smartlist_add_all(entry_nodes, worse_entry_nodes);
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17773#comment:2>
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