[tor-bugs] #17694 [Tor]: Hash PRNG output before use, so that it's not revealed to the network

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#17694: Hash PRNG output before use, so that it's not revealed to the network
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 Reporter:  teor         |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium       |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
Component:  Tor          |        Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal       |     Resolution:
 Keywords:               |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:               |         Points:
  Sponsor:               |
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Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:23 nickm]:
 > Better now?
 Jenkins seems to be happy, so yes. Thank you.

 I did a review on the `crypto_strongest_rand` function and i believe the
 `out` addition and `out_len` subtraction in the `else` block can be
 removed. (At first i thought this would cause a buffer overflow until i
 saw the `break` statement, but it still causes an integer overflow in
 `out_len`).

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17694#comment:24>
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