[tor-bugs] #16861 [Tor]: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16861: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records
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     Reporter:  mikeperry    |      Owner:  mikeperry
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  needs_review
     Priority:  normal       |  Milestone:
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
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Comment (by yawning):

 Note: Still trying to boot my brain up.

 Replying to [comment:6 arma]:
 > I've been envisioning even like a grand challenge: "Hey everybody, here
 are five attacks, they sure seem hard to resolve, especially all at once,
 but let's think about ways to increase the false positives at scale." For
 some of them even a small bump in false positive rate would be huge in
 practice. It would be neat to get two different designs and then have
 people analyze the heck out of them. Ideally even more than two.

 Another question we should pose to the research community is "we know this
 netflow thing is done, we know that a certain amount of metrics tracking
 is required as part of the administering a large scale network, is there a
 way to get an acceptable amount of information in a privacy preserving
 manner?".

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16861#comment:12>
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