[tor-bugs] #4862 [Tor]: Consider disabling dynamic intro point formula (numerology)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4862: Consider disabling dynamic intro point formula (numerology)
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     Reporter:  hellais  |      Owner:
         Type:           |     Status:  assigned
  enhancement            |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
     Priority:  major    |    Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
    Component:  Tor      |   Keywords:  needs-proposal, tor-hs,
   Resolution:           |  027-triaged-1-in, SponsorR
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:
       Points:           |
  medium/large           |
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Comment (by special):

 I agree with *b* for the same reasons as dgoulet.

 *c* (random from a range) doesn't seem justified - the operator still
 stands out for having changed it, and if they copy this configuration,
 they likely have other distinguishers in their stack.

 Replying to [comment:22 arma]:
 > I guess that question leads to a deeper question: is ten actually more
 scalable in any meaningful way than three?

 I think more than 6 (= number of HSDirs) doesn't make much sense.

 As far as I know, we have no evidence of IPs ever being the limiting
 factor for scalability. Every indication we do have is that the service
 will fall apart first, which also makes sense intuitively. It's a single
 point and does much more work than an IP.

 I could see this becoming a problem if we have many busy services, and
 they start overloading relays when many of them select the same IP. In
 that case, increasing IPs per service could help distribute the load.
 Still, this is entirely speculative, and I don't think we could build the
 right solution without actual data.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4862#comment:24>
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