[tor-bugs] #15846 [Onionoo]: Sign responses

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Apr 28 14:19:07 UTC 2015


#15846: Sign responses
-------------------------+---------------------
 Reporter:  karsten      |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal       |      Milestone:
Component:  Onionoo      |        Version:
 Keywords:               |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:               |         Points:
-------------------------+---------------------
 Nusenu [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 dev/2015-April/008726.html writes on tor-dev@]: "I might want to prove to
 third parties that I'm indeed processing/providing authentic historic
 onionoo documents from onionoo.tpo. What do you think of signing them?"

 Let's consider signing responses.  What would we gain, and how would we do
 it?

 Pros:
  - We already provide Onionoo via https.  I guess including a signature in
 the response would enable people to archive that signature and verify it
 later, which is not possible with https.  That's what Nusenu has in mind,
 I think.

 Cons:
  - Signing responses causes some computation overhead, and it makes
 responses larger.
  - Where in the JSON document would we add the signature?  Are there
 standards for this, and are there tools supporting them that can be found
 in Debian stable?  This is a con, because it's probably non-trivial to do.

 Similar to #15845, I'm leading towards no, but maybe I'm overlooking
 something.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15846>
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