[tor-bugs] #13067 [Website]: Enable OCSP Stapling for TorProject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13067: Enable OCSP Stapling for TorProject.org
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 Reporter:  tom      |          Owner:
     Type:  defect   |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal   |      Milestone:
Component:  Website  |        Version:
 Keywords:           |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:           |         Points:
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 It would be very good if TorProject.org and related websites (blog, trac)
 enabled OCSP stapling. This would not require someone to 'choose' (I say
 choose cause it's an option you set, not something you choose on each
 visit) between checking for up-to-date revocation information and
 violating their privacy by leaking the visit for TP to a random third
 party.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13067>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online