[tor-bugs] #13045 [BridgeDB]: Leekspin descriptor signatures cannot be verified by Stem

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#13045: Leekspin descriptor signatures cannot be verified by Stem
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     Reporter:  isis      |      Owner:  isis
         Type:  defect    |     Status:  accepted
     Priority:  major     |  Milestone:
    Component:  BridgeDB  |    Version:
   Resolution:            |   Keywords:  leekspin, bridgedb-parsers
Actual Points:            |  Parent ID:
       Points:            |
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Comment (by atagar):

 > Until those are fixed up, making an automated test with pylint and/or
 pep8 would just fail, which I fear would cause confusion for new
 contributors.

 Not necessarily. Stem was once in a similar boat. It took days of
 dedicated effort to shift to be mostly pep8 conformant, so what I did was
 overhauled Stem one issue at a time.

 My suggestion would be to run pep8 over BridgeDB and simply note all the
 issue types it fails for. Then blacklist them all. This is done via a
 'pep8.ignore' configuration like...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/arm.git/blob/HEAD:/test/settings.cfg

 Now tests will pass and if you get a patch for anything that violates the
 parts of pep8 you already comply with then they'll get a heads up. After
 this you can shift BridgeDB to be pep8 conformant one issue at a time. :)

 > Currently, Leekspin only generates unsanitised bridge descriptors.

 By 'unsanitised bridge descriptors' you mean regular server descriptors,
 right? If not then how do they differ?

 An open question in my mind is 'How do Leekspin and Stem's mocking module
 differ? They both make test descriptor data, right?'. Maybe there's good
 reason for them to both continue independently - I just haven't sunk the
 time into looking Leekspin over yet.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13045#comment:5>
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