[tor-bugs] #13447 [Tor]: Don't build introduction circuits until we know we can build circuits

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Mon Oct 20 18:54:20 UTC 2014


#13447: Don't build introduction circuits until we know we can build circuits
-----------------------------+--------------------------------
     Reporter:  akwizgran    |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  needs_review
     Priority:  normal       |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:  tor-hs
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
-----------------------------+--------------------------------

Comment (by akwizgran):

 Hi, I've tested this on two ARM-based Android devices - each device
 publishes a hidden service and connects to the service published by the
 other device. The controller sets DisableNetwork 1 in response to losing
 internet connectivity and DisableNetwork 0 when connectivity is restored.

 By adding some log statements to rendservice.c (not included in the final
 patch) I could see that the devices were trying to build intro circuits as
 soon as DisableNetwork was set to 0. This coincided with trying to open
 the first OR connection, so the circuits failed, up to the limit of 10
 attempts (MAX_INTRO_CIRCS_PER_PERIOD) at which point no further attempts
 were made for 5 minutes (INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD). After 5 minutes the
 next round of intro circuits succeeded. With this patch the first round is
 deferred until the guard connection has come up, so the first round
 succeeds.

 I haven't tested this patch on a relay yet.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13447#comment:3>
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