[tor-bugs] #1944 [Torperf]: Set up a Torperf to a hidden service

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Sun Oct 19 12:06:01 UTC 2014


#1944: Set up a Torperf to a hidden service
-------------------------+----------------------
     Reporter:  arma     |      Owner:
         Type:  task     |     Status:  assigned
     Priority:  normal   |  Milestone:
    Component:  Torperf  |    Version:
   Resolution:           |   Keywords:  SponsorR
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:  #2552
       Points:  3        |
-------------------------+----------------------

Comment (by asn):

 Some more thoughts on this.

 Here is a breakdown of connection steps from client to HS:
     - Fetch descriptor
     - Alice establishes RP
     - Alice sends `INTRODUCE1`
     - Alice receives `INTRODUCE_ACK` / Alice receives `RENDEZVOUS2`
     - Connect to HS (Alice sent `RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN` cell)
     - Connect to webserver (Alice sent `HTTP GET /`)
     - Complete request (how can we break this down even more?)

 It seems that our measurements are missing the `Alice sends INTRODUCE1`
 step, which would allow us to break down the `acknowledge introduction`
 step even more.

 Now here is a breakdown from the HS to the client:
     - Bob received `INTRODUCE2` from IP
     - Bob connected to RP (Bob sent `RENDEZVOUS1`)
     - Bob received `RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN`
     - Bob received application data

 I wonder if we can make a test that collects both Client->HS measurements
 and HS->Client measurements and then combines them somehow. That would
 allow us to get even finer granularity in our measurements.

 BTW, the fact that the `complete request` step has an outlier at 800+
 seconds stretches the graph, and doesn't allow us to look at the other
 events in good detail. If we are mainly interested in circuit
 establishment performance, maybe we should only test small files anyway,
 so that the graphs are spread less.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1944#comment:34>
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