[tor-bugs] #8239 [Tor]: Hidden services should try harder to reuse their old intro points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8239: Hidden services should try harder to reuse their old intro points
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     Reporter:  arma         |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal       |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:  SponsorR tor-hs 026-triaged-1
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
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Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:8 arma]:
 > Replying to [comment:6 asn]:
 > > FWIW, it's also worth mentioning that making HSes more stubborn
 towards old IPs might also allow guard discovery attacks from the IP. That
 is the IP kills incoming circuits, till a compromised middle node is
 selected, and since the HS is stubborn it will keep on establishing new
 circuits.
 >
 > That's why you should only stick to your intro point when it's your
 network that failed (that is, the connection between you and your guard),
 not the intro circuit. (This is what I meant in the body of the bug in the
 'main tricky point' sentence.)

 Hm, indeed. Distinguishing network down events has been annoying also for
 entry guard security (https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 dev/2014-August/007346.html).
 I wonder if this is an easier case though.

 How many ways are there for an IP to terminate the intro circuit? Are they
 enumerable?

 If the IP closes the connection to its previous hop, will the other hops
 report that it was the IP's fault that the circuit was destroyed?

 Can the IP send an unexpected cell to the guard node, and force the guard
 node to tear down the circuit? So that it looks like it's the fault of the
 guard node?

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8239#comment:9>
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