[tor-bugs] #13718 [Tor]: Reachability Tests aren't conducted if there are no exit nodes

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Nov 21 09:21:37 UTC 2014


#13718: Reachability Tests aren't conducted if there are no exit nodes
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     Reporter:  tom     |      Owner:  teor
         Type:  defect  |     Status:  assigned
     Priority:  normal  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
    Component:  Tor     |    Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.1-alpha
   Resolution:          |   Keywords:  tor-relay test-network lorax chutney
Actual Points:          |  Parent ID:
       Points:          |
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Comment (by teor):

 Happy to make these changes, Nick.

 I've now seen the statuses pop up when launching TorBrowser using this
 build, so I understand the need to comprehensibility.

 > I kinda want an enum for the argument to router_have_minimum_dir_info(),
 rather than a boolean. It seems like it would be clearer that way. Or
 possibly, there should be two wrappers around it:
 have_minimum_dir_info_for_exit_circ(),
 have_minimum_dir_info_for_internal_circ().

 Is there the possibility of needing to calculate weights for guard,
 middle, and exit nodes in arbitrary combinations? (i.e. before choosing a
 guard node, ensure minimum guard bandwidth) If so, we could use a set of
 bit-shift flags.

 If not, I'm happy to set up an enum with the two current values of Exit
 and Internal, and possibly an aliased value for those circumstances where
 we want a default option.

 We may also need to update the status/enough-dir-info GETINFO control
 event  - should we add status/enough-dir-info/exit and status/enough-dir-
 info/internal (we default status/enough-dir-info to exit for backwards
 compatibility).

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13718#comment:10>
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