[tor-bugs] #13718 [Tor]: Reachability Tests aren't conducted if there are no exit nodes

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Nov 20 11:28:49 UTC 2014


#13718: Reachability Tests aren't conducted if there are no exit nodes
------------------------+--------------------------------------------------
     Reporter:  tom     |      Owner:  teor
         Type:  defect  |     Status:  assigned
     Priority:  normal  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
    Component:  Tor     |    Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.1-alpha
   Resolution:          |   Keywords:  tor-relay test-network lorax chutney
Actual Points:          |  Parent ID:
       Points:          |
------------------------+--------------------------------------------------
Changes (by teor):

 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.6.1-alpha


Comment:

 I've posted the draft tor changes to:

 '''Branch:''' bug13718-stop-req-exits-for-or-conns
 '''Repository:''' ​​​​​https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

 The branch contains two commits:
  * ignore exits when checking min dir info for internal connections
 (includes detailed log messages). This is the maximally compatible change
 that could be back-ported. Reported BOOTSTRAP_STATUS values try to look as
 much like the old version as possible. (Some duplicate events may be
 generated.)
  * split BOOTSTRAP_STATUS into INTERNAL and EXIT stages. This changes the
 values and number of events the controller will receive. This helps in
 determining whether we're hanging waiting for internal or exit paths. But
 it isn't necessary to back-port it.

 I'll attach my continuous testing script, which could go in chutney or
 tor, if it would be useful. (Which one, Nick?)

 I'm currently testing the failure rate of this code on OS X (i386 &
 x86_64), can others test on Linux & Windows?

 This also probably needs some simple unit tests. Not quite sure how to
 write those.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13718#comment:7>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online


More information about the tor-bugs mailing list