[tor-bugs] #13635 [Tor]: Time to retire SIZE_T_CEILING?

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#13635: Time to retire SIZE_T_CEILING?
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 Reporter:  nickm   |          Owner:
     Type:  defect  |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal  |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
Component:  Tor     |        Version:
 Keywords:          |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:          |         Points:
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 Back in a980446d, we added a maximum value for any size_t that we would
 accept in tor_malloc() or tor_realloc().  If you pass those functions a
 value greater than SSIZE_MAX - 16, we assume that you probably had an
 integer underflow or something , and you need to hit an assertion.

 But this check is silly, isn't it?  malloc() will usually refuse to give
 you that much memory, and our post-malloc assertion will catch it.  On the
 other hand, if malloc _would_ give you that much memory, then who are we
 to argue with it?

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13635>
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