[tor-bugs] #12064 [Tor]: Tor should be able to read all files it creates when Sandbox enabled.

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#12064: Tor should be able to read all files it creates when Sandbox enabled.
---------------------------+--------------------------------
     Reporter:  alphawolf  |      Owner:  nickm
         Type:  defect     |     Status:  reopened
     Priority:  normal     |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
    Component:  Tor        |    Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.4-alpha
   Resolution:             |   Keywords:  sandbox
Actual Points:             |  Parent ID:
       Points:             |
---------------------------+--------------------------------
Changes (by alphawolf):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 I'm getting a stack trace on the hidden services.  I thought it was
 because of the trailing '/' on `HiddenServiceDir`, but it seems to happen
 even when I get rid of that.  The only difference is that the '/' is not
 doubled up in the bug message as it is below.  Note, this only happens
 after HUP.
 {{{
 HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
 HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
 }}}

 {{{
 May 22 22:01:24.000 [notice] Received reload signal (hup). Reloading
 config and resetting internal state.
 May 22 22:01:24.000 [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-
 service-defaults-torrc".
 May 22 22:01:24.000 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
 May 22 22:01:24.000 [notice] Tor 0.2.5.4-alpha-dev (git-cfd0ee514c279bc6)
 opening log file.
 May 22 22:01:24.000 [warn] sandbox_intern_string(): Bug: No interned
 sandbox parameter found for /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
 May 22 22:01:24.000 [warn] sandbox_intern_string(): Bug: No interned
 sandbox parameter found for /var/lib/tor/hidden_service//hostname.tmp

 ============================================================ T= 1400810484
 (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall open)
 /usr/bin/tor(+0x1239aa)[0x7f0e05c959aa]
 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0(open64+0x10)[0x7f0e04778180]
 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0(open64+0x10)[0x7f0e04778180]
 /usr/bin/tor(tor_open_cloexec+0x40)[0x7f0e05c82360]
 /usr/bin/tor(start_writing_to_file+0xfb)[0x7f0e05c90f7b]
 /usr/bin/tor(+0x11f0db)[0x7f0e05c910db]
 /usr/bin/tor(+0x11f228)[0x7f0e05c91228]
 /usr/bin/tor(+0x5a218)[0x7f0e05bcc218]
 /usr/bin/tor(rend_service_load_all_keys+0x81)[0x7f0e05bce231]
 /usr/bin/tor(set_options+0xb9a)[0x7f0e05c2e4ba]
 /usr/bin/tor(options_init_from_string+0x2d9)[0x7f0e05c2fcf9]
 /usr/bin/tor(options_init_from_torrc+0x1a7)[0x7f0e05c2fff7]
 /usr/bin/tor(process_signal+0x46c)[0x7f0e05ba93ac]
 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x9a5)[0x7f0e051fe715]
 /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x195)[0x7f0e05ba8285]
 /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0xd75)[0x7f0e05baa6e5]
 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf5)[0x7f0e041dcb45]
 /usr/bin/tor(+0x32adb)[0x7f0e05ba4adb]
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12064#comment:8>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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