[tor-bugs] #11973 [Tor]: Should relays stop making unencrypted directory connections?
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Sat May 17 16:34:21 UTC 2014
#11973: Should relays stop making unencrypted directory connections?
------------------------+------------------------------
Reporter: nickm | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: unspecified
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: needs-proposal
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
------------------------+------------------------------
Comment (by bburley):
I have a better understanding now of the reasoning behind using direct or
encrypted sessions when communicating with the authorities. (1) Cost of
server resources, and (2) protecting information believed to not need
protecting.
I don't know the value of (1), but I do believe that removing an
additional way of someone determining you are operating as part of the Tor
infrastructure in valuable. Yes, someone can enumerate the Tor
infrastructure by installing a client. That is one way to get information
if they are looking for who is running Tor nodes. Someone trying to figure
out what a particular server is running, not looking for Tor specifically,
is a different attack/angle. Not encrypting that info allows someone to
determine a server is running Tor when they weren't looking for it in the
first place, but now they know.
Would it be reasonable have an option created to turn this capability
on/off?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11973#comment:2>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
More information about the tor-bugs
mailing list