[tor-bugs] #6799 [Tor]: Don't expire unused relay-to-relay TLS conns so quickly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6799: Don't expire unused relay-to-relay TLS conns so quickly
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
     Reporter:  arma     |      Owner:
         Type:  defect   |     Status:  needs_review
     Priority:  major    |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
    Component:  Tor      |    Version:
   Resolution:           |   Keywords:  tor-relay anonymity-attack
Actual Points:           |  025-triaged 024-backport andrea-review-0255
       Points:           |  Parent ID:
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 {{{
  if (or_conn->chan) {
 }}}
 Why need this check? If it's NULL then code will crash later anyway:
 {{{
 if (channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan)) &&
 }}}


 {{{
 timestamp_last_had_circuits = chan->timestamp_last_had_circuits;
 }}}
 Happens twice. Why?


 {{{
 time_t timestamp_last_had_circuits = now;
 }}}
 Why inits not to zero? Why need to init?

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6799#comment:22>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online