[tor-bugs] #11880 [Tor]: Make all Tor nodes obfs3 by default

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Jun 25 23:09:03 UTC 2014


#11880: Make all Tor nodes obfs3 by default
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     Reporter:  SalonTable   |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal       |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
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Comment (by yawning):

 So as it stands right now, this is fairly close to unworkable, baring some
 major changes to the Tor architecture.  There are quite a few reasons why
 `obfs3` specifically would be a terrible idea (performance, lack of
 authentication, vulnerability to certain attacks), and one gigantic reason
 why even something like `obfs4` is unworkable:

     The list of non-bridge Tor nodes is public.  Obfuscating the link
 protocol to non-bridge relays is totally pointless as anyone  can grab the
 directory information and see if the obfuscated flow is to a Tor relay.
 The Tor Project even provides handy archives of this information as part
 of our metrics efforts.  Changing the architecture to remove this would be
 a massive undertaking involving a lot of research (One possible approach
 would be to use a system similar to i2p's floodfill design).

 If someone is feeling extremely ambitious, they could start looking into
 how to change to a more decentralized directory model, but till that
 research is done and has undergone a massive amount of review, obfuscating
 traffic to non-bridge nodes doesn't gain anything.

 nb: I can make a fairly good argument for "It would be great if Tor could
 use a non-TLS link protocol", but the rationale for that is more centred
 around "OpenSSL is OpenSSL" rather than "obfuscation".

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11880#comment:3>
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