[tor-bugs] #12201 [Tor]: Don't weight by bandwidth when selecting among bridges
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Wed Jun 4 18:21:44 UTC 2014
#12201: Don't weight by bandwidth when selecting among bridges
----------------------------------+---------------------
Reporter: asn | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: tor-bridge tor-guard | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
----------------------------------+---------------------
In `choose_random_entry_impl()` we have:
{{{
choose_and_finish:
if (entry_list_is_constrained(options)) {
/* We need to weight by bandwidth, because our bridges or entryguards
* were not already selected proportional to their bandwidth. */
node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(live_entry_guards,
WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD);
}}}
This means that bridges are also selected proportional to their bandwidth.
However, since there is no bandwidth authorities for bridges their
bandwidth is self-reported and potentially a lie. For this reason, it's
probably not a good idea to use those values during path selection, since
an evil bridge can try to dominate the guard probability.
Fortunately, we also have `bridge_get_advertised_bandwidth_bounded()`
which bounds bridges bandwidth between 20kB/s and 100kB/s. So the danger
can't be that great.
Still, it might be a better idea to pick amongst bridges in a uniform
random way.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12201>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
More information about the tor-bugs
mailing list