[tor-bugs] #1038 [Tor]: Problem facing connecting a Tor client to a Tor hidden server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1038: Problem facing connecting a Tor client to a Tor hidden server
---------------------------+-------------------------
     Reporter:  sambuddho  |      Owner:
         Type:  defect     |     Status:  closed
     Priority:  major      |  Milestone:
    Component:  Tor        |    Version:  0.2.1.17-rc
   Resolution:  Fixed      |   Keywords:
Actual Points:             |  Parent ID:
       Points:             |
---------------------------+-------------------------

Old description:

> This is with regards to an email exchange that took place few days back
> on the or-talk mailing list. The anonymous
> client connects to the hidden service quite intermittently . However it
> does sometimes connects (say in 1 in 20 chances).
> The client and server are properly configured using default configuration
> for the client and configuration for the server
> which indicates the appropriate directory where the server stores the
> appropriate files and the appropriate hidden service port
> number where service requests are to be directed. I am sure of it since I
> the client works fine otherwise (when not connecting
> anonymously to a non-anonymous service) and so does the server (when
> being used as a client). Only in some instances is the
> client able to communicate with the hidden service (as mentioned
> earlier).
>

> This is what Roger Dingledine has to say regarding the issue :
>
> "
> I think there's a real bug here. I've been playing with it on and off. I
> think that when Tor has a rendezvous circuit that it thinks it should
> like, and suddenly changes its mind, then it discards that circuit and
> starts working on a new one (which is good), but at the same time it
> closes the socks stream (which is bad).
>
> Fixing that bug, if it turns out to actually be a bug, would mean that
> hidden services are dirt slow when making the initial connection (until
> we make Tor itself faster at least), but they're not as flaky as they
> currently appear.
>

> --Roger
> "
>  I can send the notices.log and debug.log files from both the client and
> the hidden service to you as and when needed . They
> are too big to fit in here . Let me know if it is needed , and I can send
> to you those files to appropriate email ids where
>  you would like them .
>
> Thanks
> Sambuddho
>
> [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: Other Linux]

New description:

 This is with regards to an email exchange that took place few days back on
 the or-talk mailing list. The anonymous
 client connects to the hidden service quite intermittently . However it
 does sometimes connects (say in 1 in 20 chances).
 The client and server are properly configured using default configuration
 for the client and configuration for the server
 which indicates the appropriate directory where the server stores the
 appropriate files and the appropriate hidden service port
 number where service requests are to be directed. I am sure of it since I
 the client works fine otherwise (when not connecting
 anonymously to a non-anonymous service) and so does the server (when being
 used as a client). Only in some instances is the
 client able to communicate with the hidden service (as mentioned earlier).


 This is what Roger Dingledine has to say regarding the issue :

 "
 I think there's a real bug here. I've been playing with it on and off. I
 think that when Tor has a rendezvous circuit that it thinks it should
 like, and suddenly changes its mind, then it discards that circuit and
 starts working on a new one (which is good), but at the same time it
 closes the socks stream (which is bad).

 Fixing that bug, if it turns out to actually be a bug, would mean that
 hidden services are dirt slow when making the initial connection (until
 we make Tor itself faster at least), but they're not as flaky as they
 currently appear.


 --Roger
 "
  I can send the notices.log and debug.log files from both the client and
 the hidden service to you as and when needed . They
 are too big to fit in here . Let me know if it is needed , and I can send
 to you those files to appropriate email ids where
  you would like them .

 Thanks
 Sambuddho

 [Automatically added by flyspray2trac: Operating System: Other Linux]

--

Comment (by arma):

 In Tor 0.2.4.23 and 0.2.5.6-alpha, we removed hack #3, because it does
 turn out to be harmful:
 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-
 traffic-confirmation-attack
 and because the buggy relays are long gone from the network.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1038#comment:13>
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