[tor-bugs] #3455 [Firefox Patch Issues]: Tor Browser should set SOCKS username for a request based on first party domain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3455: Tor Browser should set SOCKS username for a request based  on first party
domain
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     Reporter:  mikeperry            |      Owner:  mikeperry
         Type:  enhancement          |     Status:  needs_information
     Priority:  major                |  Milestone:  TorBrowserBundle
    Component:  Firefox Patch        |  2.3.x-stable
  Issues                             |    Version:
   Resolution:                       |   Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-
Actual Points:                       |  usability
       Points:                       |  Parent ID:  #5752
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Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:29 proper]:
 > Replying to [comment:28 arthuredelstein]:
 > > (2) dynamically creating additional SOCKSPorts through tor's
 ControlPort whenever a new first party domain is encountered. [...]
 > > (2) requires only JavaScript code in torbutton to set new SOCKSPorts.
 >
 > Will this work with multiple browser tabs as well? What is when traffic
 is created in two different tabs with different first party domains at the
 same time? My concern is, that these circuits would get mixed. But perhaps
 it's unjustified.

 My understanding is that circuits for two tabs would not get mixed even
 for simultaneous loading. According to the tor manual: "By default,
 streams received on different SOCKSPorts, TransPorts, etc are always
 isolated from one another." In option (2), each of two tabs would have a
 different first party domain, so all requests from one tab would be sent
 over one SOCKSPort, and all requests from the other tab would be sent over
 a second SOCKSPort. Option (1) uses a very similar mechanism, in that we
 would rely on username/password instead of port number to separate the
 circuits for the two tabs.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3455#comment:30>
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