[tor-bugs] #10419 [Firefox Patch Issues]: Can requests to 127.0.0.1 be used to fingerprint the browser?

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#10419: Can requests to 127.0.0.1 be used to fingerprint the browser?
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     Reporter:  mikeperry            |      Owner:  mikeperry
         Type:  task                 |     Status:  needs_review
     Priority:  major                |  Milestone:
    Component:  Firefox Patch        |    Version:
  Issues                             |   Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,
   Resolution:                       |  tbb-pref, MikePerry201401R
Actual Points:                       |  Parent ID:
       Points:                       |
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Changes (by mikeperry):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting => tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-pref,
     MikePerry201401R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I think that oc is right about not needing to browse localhost from TBB.
 On top of that, I had assumed that the network.proxy.no_proxies_on setting
 applied to *all* XUL JS too, so I never bothered trying to remove it,
 thinking it was an obvious non-solution. In retrospect, it makes sense
 that it does not harm New Identity or anything else in TBB, because we use
 XPCOM socket interfaces for our extension-based localhost connections, and
 not nsIChannel.

 I'm going to try driving TBB on Mac and Linux around without it and see if
 I notice anything. New Identity at least works fine on both here, too,
 though. Which is a good sign.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10419#comment:13>
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