[tor-bugs] #10676 [Tor]: Verify urandom-style RNG is seeded before generating ID keys

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#10676: Verify urandom-style RNG is seeded before generating ID keys
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     Reporter:  nickm        |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  needs_review
     Priority:  major        |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:  tor-server rng urandom startup
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
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Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:7 nickm]:
 > It appears that
 [http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=random&sektion=4&manpath=FreeBSD+5.0-RELEASE
 in recent FreeBSD at least] the strategy in this patch won't '''hurt''',
 since all /dev/*random access blocks if the RNG is not seeded.  We'd
 better dig through old manpages to see whether there was a time when this
 wasn't so.

 Apparently FreeBSD started doing this in version 5.0.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10676#comment:8>
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