[tor-bugs] #8244 [Tor]: The HSDirs for a hidden service should not be predictable indefinitely into the future

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#8244: The HSDirs for a hidden service should not be predictable indefinitely into
the future
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     Reporter:  arma         |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal       |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:  tor-hs needs-proposal
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
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Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:18 qSKvY]:
 > I think if you just wanted to generate a nonce with that system you'd
 still need to perform the same checks. Most of them seem to be for proving
 that all the shares have been correctly created and encrypted and that
 nothing has been corrupted.
 >
 > It looks like it'd be well suited for layering on top of an existing
 Byzantine fault tolerant consensus system [like Tor's directory protocol].
 Their requirement of a synchronous network or an "incorruptible third
 party" is a little worrisome though.

 Yep, seems that way.

 FWIW, here is the proposal of Nick Hopper:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-December/005944.html
 We need to look into this more. See what kind of "proof of knowledge" can
 work, look into generation of threshold elgamal keypairs, etc.

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8244#comment:19>
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