[tor-bugs] #11096 [Tor bundles/installation]: Randomize MAC address before start of Tor

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#11096: Randomize MAC address before start of Tor
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     Reporter:  csoghoian                 |      Owner:  erinn
         Type:  enhancement               |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal                    |  Milestone:
    Component:  Tor bundles/installation  |    Version:
   Resolution:                            |   Keywords:
Actual Points:                            |  Parent ID:
       Points:                            |
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Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Protecting against malware after it is already running on your system is
 very difficult and way out of tor's scope. Also, most network cards don't
 support permanently changing your MAC (you can see this when you run
 macchanger, it shows your permanent MAC) so the malware could just read
 the permanent MAC anyway.

 However, changing your MAC *is* good for preventing LAN adversaries from
 linking your presence/activity in different locations, and Tails can do
 this (and hopefully will do it by default soon):
 https://tails.boum.org/doc/advanced_topics/mac_changer/index.en.html

 Non-Tails users who are worried about network adversaries linking their
 presence in multiple locations should be aware of #10969 (set of guard
 nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint) which is much more significant
 than the MAC address since the guard connections are visible to the user's
 ISP as opposed to just their LAN. (Tails doesn't use persistent guards
 (yet), so this isn't a problem there.)

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Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11096#comment:1>
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