[tor-bugs] #9969 [Tor]: We launch 50 microdesc requests, spread out over just three guards?

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Sat Feb 8 08:48:26 UTC 2014


#9969: We launch 50 microdesc requests, spread out over just three guards?
------------------------+--------------------------------
     Reporter:  arma    |      Owner:
         Type:  defect  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  major   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
    Component:  Tor     |    Version:
   Resolution:          |   Keywords:  tor-client
Actual Points:          |  Parent ID:
       Points:          |
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Comment (by karsten):

 A few thoughts:
  - Would it help if we implemented `/tor/micro/all` which is mentioned in
 dir-spec section 5.2 "Downloading router descriptors or microdescriptors"
 but which is not implemented yet?  Of course, then clients would download
 the bulk of microdescriptors from a single directory.
  - Do we have to include full digests in requests, or would it be
 sufficient to ask for the first few digest bytes?  Assuming that clients
 would only accept descriptors matching locally stored full digests.  For
 example, requests could contain only the first 4 (or 8) base64 chars
 representing the first 3 (or 6) digest bytes.  Directories could accept
 any multiple of 4 base64 chars.
  - Mixing the two ideas, how about we add a way to ask for 1/2, 1/4, etc.
 of all microdescriptors in a single request?  The request could be
 `/tor/micro/all/<base64-prefix>/<bits>`, so that `/tor/micro/all/A/1`
 means all digests starting with 0 binary, `/tor/micro/all/w/2` means all
 digests starting with 11 binary, etc.  Clients could decide how many
 requests to send from the number of descriptors they need, which may
 change over time.

 Each of these ideas requires us to upgrade authorities and caches before
 clients will be able to use them.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9969#comment:3>
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