[tor-bugs] #10419 [Firefox Patch Issues]: Can requests to 127.0.0.1 be used to fingerprint the browser?
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
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Tue Feb 4 03:58:41 UTC 2014
#10419: Can requests to 127.0.0.1 be used to fingerprint the browser?
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Reporter: mikeperry | Owner: mikeperry
Type: task | Status: needs_review
Priority: major | Milestone:
Component: Firefox Patch | Version:
Issues | Keywords: tbb-fingerprinting,
Resolution: | tbb-pref, MikePerry201401R
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by mo):
Replying to [comment:28 mikeperry]:
> I want to avoid NoScript ABE policies if at all possible. Does
completely emptying network.proxy.no_proxies_on break CUPS? Or printing on
any other platform? I don't use CUPS.
You cannot break printing or CUPS, all TBB could block is access to the
local CUPS web admin panel from inside TBB (create/edit/delete printers).
I don't see why people can't use a second browser for local web services.
CUPS via web is so 1990s and ugly, any "beginner" uses a GUI to configure
their printers. To me, it sounds simpler and safer to just disable any
localhost access from within the browser, and one should not have to rely
on an extension to take care of it.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10419#comment:31>
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