[tor-bugs] #13792 [Tor]: HS statistics for private tor network to gather info on services, clients and relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13792: HS statistics for private tor network to gather info on services, clients
and relays
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     Reporter:  dgoulet  |      Owner:
         Type:  task     |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal   |  Milestone:
    Component:  Tor      |    Version:
   Resolution:           |   Keywords:  tor-hs, SponsorR
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:
       Points:           |
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Comment (by dgoulet):

 Ok so the initial post for the framework to measure performance is here:

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-December/007989.html

 The post is mostly instructions and where to get the tools for it. I'll
 detail here the measurement we have up to now thus helping us add or
 modify or remove some.

 ==== Introduction Point ====

 * Circuit build time
   * Time from circuit is launched to "has opened" event.
 * Established time
   * Time of rend_service_launch_establish_intro())
 * Ready time
   * From the start of rend_service_launch_establish_intro() to the
 INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell
 * Cannibalized (0|1)

 ==== Rendezvous Point ====

 * Circuit build time
   * Time from circuit is launched to "has opened" event.
 * Established time
   * Time from the creation of the rdv point up to finishing handling the
 RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED cell.
 * Establish rdv to RENDEZVOUS2 cell
   * Time from the ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell to the RENDEZVOUS2 end of
 processing cell.
 * Ready time
   * Time from the creation of the rdv point up to receiving the
 RENDEZVOUS2 cell which indicates that data is ready for transmission.
 * Cannibalized (0|1)

 ==== HSDir Client ====

 * Fetch time
   * Time of rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc()
 * Store time
   * When a fetched desc. is successfully stored
 (rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client())


 Note that it's not that trivial to match client/service trace events since
 well this is an anonimity network and it's by design that we can't match
 both. However in a controlled network of 1 client and 1 HS, there are some
 assumptions we can make vis-a-vis ordering of events thus possible to
 match them.

 We can do much more but this is the intial part I have which gives us
 pretty graph already and a clear picture of the timings in the HS
 subsystem.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13792#comment:4>
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