[tor-bugs] #13192 [Tor]: Collect aggregate stats of total hidden service usage vs total exit usage in Tor network

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Tue Dec 9 15:30:05 UTC 2014


#13192: Collect aggregate stats of total hidden service usage vs total exit usage
in Tor network
-----------------------------+---------------------------------
     Reporter:  arma         |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  needs_review
     Priority:  normal       |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:  SponsorR, tor-relay
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
-----------------------------+---------------------------------

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Quick comment also, I was worried about the
 {{{hs_stats->rp_relay_cells_seen}}} overflow possibility. I did an easy
 calculation to see how much data needs to go through the RP for that:

 This is an unsigned long where on x86 64 bits it's 64 bit thus humongeous.
 However, on 32 bit it goes up to {{{2^32}}} and with each cell at 512
 bytes.

 {{{
 ((2^32) * 512) = 2199023255552 bytes of total data before overflow.
 (((2199023255552/1024)/1024)/1024) = 2048 Gigabytes
                  ^K    ^M    ^G
 }}}

 Thus, one would have to send through ~2TB of data to make that stat goes
 round and around (on 32 bit system) :).

 Code looks good to me! There are still log statement though that I'm not
 sure we want upstream like below but I'll wait for the big squash :).

 {{{
 +    log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Saw new RP cell in %u.",
 +             TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_circ_id);
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13192#comment:18>
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