[tor-bugs] #10969 [Tor]: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Aug 1 23:26:08 UTC 2014
#10969: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint
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Reporter: asn | Owner:
Type: task | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: tor-client, tor-guards,
Actual Points: | 026-triaged-1
Points: | Parent ID: #11480
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Comment (by cypherpunks):
Not using guards (setting {{{UseEntryGuards 0}}}) actually means you'll
pick a new entry node for every circuit. This will greatly reduce the
amount of time it takes for you to eventually pick a malicious relay as an
entry node. If you're concerned about this issue but aren't using one of
the tools linked above, a better option (than {{{UseEntryGuards 0}}}) is
to leave UseEntryGuards enabled (the default) but stop tor and nuke your
state file to get a new set of guards whenever you physically relocate.
Is there any progress on fixing this properly? Or are you waiting to see
some XKEYSCORE fingerprints showing that this linkable information is
actually being linked?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10969#comment:9>
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