[tor-bugs] #11396 [Tor]: Detect maximum memory at runtime to allow lower default than 8GB

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Apr 4 04:55:08 UTC 2014


#11396: Detect maximum memory at runtime to allow lower default than 8GB
-----------------------------+--------------------------------
     Reporter:  nickm        |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  needs_review
     Priority:  normal       |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:  tor-relay oom
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
-----------------------------+--------------------------------

Comment (by arma):

 Perhaps counterintuitively, so long as we get Linux sorted out, the others
 don't matter as much. That's because the main anonymity attacks involve
 knocking over many big relays, and if half the relays resist, your attack
 doesn't get very far.

 But that said, we shouldn't do this ticket simply because of a particular
 anonymity attack that is made possible by this design flaw. We should do
 the ticket so relays can't be knocked over (or worse, be used to knock
 over other innocent processes if you run one).

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11396#comment:2>
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