[tor-bugs] #9206 [Tor]: 'Guard' flags only assigned to first nodes started in a private Tor network

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#9206: 'Guard' flags only assigned to first nodes started in a private Tor network
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     Reporter:  karsten  |      Owner:
         Type:  defect   |     Status:  needs_review
     Priority:  normal   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
    Component:  Tor      |    Version:
   Resolution:           |   Keywords:  tor-auth tor-relay simulation
Actual Points:           |  testing
       Points:           |  Parent ID:
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Changes (by ln5):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Based on looking at how the directory authorities vote Guard in a
 Chutney network (without bandwidth authority data), generating 'state'
 files for relays for which we want to influence Guard seems best.

 Writing something high, like 10*1024*1024, for the following values in
 the 'state file for a relay will give it Fast and Guard.

 >>>>
 BWHistoryReadValues 10485760
 BWHistoryReadMaxima 10485760
 BWHistoryWriteValues 10485760
 BWHistoryWriteMaxima 10485760
 >>>>

 Making sure that a relay does _not_ get Guard is less straight forward
 -- simply setting something low will make fast_bandwidth_kb become so
 low that they will still be fast. Also, when relays advertize zero
 bandwidth, things become weird.

 See bug9206 in my Chutney repo for a quick'n'dirty change to
 tools/bootstrap-network.sh which does this for relays (not dirauths
 and client).

 If we think that this would be useful to Chutney users we could make
 Node.__init__() take a "flag_hints" parameter saying things like FH_Guard
 and generate a fake history accordingly instead of having the bootstrap
 script doing it. Let me know.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9206#comment:11>
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