[tor-bugs] #9767 [Tor]: Implement proposal 222: Eliminate client timestamps in Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9767: Implement proposal 222: Eliminate client timestamps in Tor
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
     Reporter:  nickm    |      Owner:
         Type:  defect   |     Status:  needs_review
     Priority:  major    |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.4.x-final
    Component:  Tor      |    Version:
   Resolution:           |   Keywords:  tor-client fingerprinting time
Actual Points:           |  prop222
       Points:           |  Parent ID:
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Comment (by andrea):

 Replying to [comment:4 nickm]:
 > When I last spoke to Ben, and based on my conversations on the tls-wg
 mailing list, I got the impression that maybe just killing off
 gmt_unix_time for everybody might be a winning proposition.  Let's see how
 that goes before permanently deciding that we'll never get adoption. After
 all, the grounds for putting the timestamp in the standard are deeply
 stupid.  Perhaps sanity will win?  :)    ...   :(

 We can hope...

 > As for how to do this without an openssl patch, there's also the silly
 approach I described in
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7277#comment:8 .

 Yeah, that's possible too.  I'm not 100% sure off the top of my head ELF
 lets you get away with intercepting a call that doesn't cross library
 boundaries like that, but it's worth a shot.

 Hmm, actually, isn't RAND_* in libcrypto and the call we need to worry
 about in libssl?

 > But other than the openssl part, how was the Tor patch? :)

 See my other comment :)

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9767#comment:6>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online