[tor-bugs] #10024 [Tor]: Close and open sockets on IP change, tracking

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Fri Oct 25 06:33:26 UTC 2013


#10024: Close and open sockets on IP change, tracking
-------------------------+------------------------------------
 Reporter:  grarpamp     |          Owner:
     Type:  enhancement  |         Status:  new
 Priority:  normal       |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component:  Tor          |        Version:  Tor: 0.2.3.25
 Keywords:               |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:               |         Points:
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 For hosts that have dynamic/roaming/dhcp/manual IP changes, is there
 a controller toggle that will cause Tor to shut down all external
 TCP/UDP connections and state... and then start fresh ones upon the
 user toggling Tor back up after an IP change?  Seems that
 without that, having TCP/UDP retransmit could lead to flow and finer
 (seq num, etc) matching to the user's former IP. It wouldn't
 necessarily have to change the guards, but that could be an extended
 option.

 eg: Is there anything to be done for the Tor instance itself to not
 be trackable across an IP change?

 If so, is monitoring the interface using some OS provided interface API
 possible versus a dhcp/user driven controller toggle? Note multiple
 stacks,
 multiple interfaces, secondary addresses, and vm's etc.

 DHCP's unpredictable IP changes and complex state machine / scripts
 would make dhcp hard for the typical user to hook into.

 A controller toggle would still be needed anyway for those who
 manually change their IP.

 There may be some small network or client/server benefit to maintaining
 things like descriptors in core as opposed to just restarting Tor.

 And should this tie in to sighup actions?

 I think this may have been discussed recently, if so just pull
 from and close this.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10024>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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