[tor-bugs] #10221 [Tor]: Implement BGP malicious route checks before publishing descriptor in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10221: Implement BGP malicious route checks before publishing descriptor in
consensus
-----------------------------+--------------------------------
     Reporter:  anon         |      Owner:
         Type:  enhancement  |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal       |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
    Component:  Tor          |    Version:
   Resolution:               |   Keywords:  BGP needs-proposal
Actual Points:               |  Parent ID:
       Points:               |
-----------------------------+--------------------------------
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  BGP => BGP needs-proposal
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Interesting.  Is there an easy-to-use tool to check for route hijacking?

 One worrisome thing here is that you'd need a way to keep this feature
 from turning into a selective DoS tool.  If any Tor node gets kicked out
 of the consensus for having ''any'' (!) route to that node hijacked, then
 we're effectively giving the adversary the ability to kick Tor nodes off
 the network, potentially reshaping the network more to their likelihood.
 Somebody needs to do the math to figure out whether this is somehow an
 improvement or not.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/10221#comment:1>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online