[tor-bugs] #5595 [Tor]: Some relays tried to refetch maatuska's new certificate repeatedly

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Sun May 12 04:37:39 UTC 2013


#5595: Some relays tried to refetch maatuska's new certificate repeatedly
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 Reporter:  rransom                 |          Owner:  andrea            
     Type:  defect                  |         Status:  new               
 Priority:  critical                |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component:  Tor                     |        Version:                    
 Keywords:  tor-relay 023-backport  |         Parent:                    
   Points:                          |   Actualpoints:                    
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Comment(by andrea):

 Replying to [comment:24 arma]:
 > Seems like it would be wise to try a certificate rotation with this in
 place in 0.2.4, before backporting it to 0.2.3. Then we'd at least explode
 the Tors of people who know they're running an alpha. :)

 Yeah, surviving a cert rotation without exploding or repeatedly refetching
 is the real test of this; since it'd already have a cert for every
 authority in that case, it'd end up using the new fp-sk queries rather
 than the fp ones.

 Since an earlier draft of this didn't include the test of whether we
 already knew any certificate at all for an authority, on bootstrapping it
 would launch both the fp requests for the authority certs and fp-sk
 requests for all the specific signing keys seen in the consensus, and then
 get identical results for both, and whichever finished later would give a
 warning about duplicates.  That prompted the revision in question, but
 also makes me confident the fp-sk requests do work correctly.  Testing
 bootstrapping doesn't provide any scenario in which *only fp-sk* requests
 are used as in a certificate rotation, though.

 It's probably worth looking into how difficult it is to simulate a
 certificate rotation with Chutney, too.  If we ever manage to turn Chutney
 into a real integration test suite, that should probably be one of the
 scenarios it runs.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5595#comment:25>
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