[tor-bugs] #9001 [Tor]: Slow Guard Discovery of Hidden Services and Clients

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Sun Jun 16 23:46:47 UTC 2013


#9001: Slow Guard Discovery of Hidden Services and Clients
---------------------------------------------+------------------------------
 Reporter:  mikeperry                        |          Owner:                    
     Type:  defect                           |         Status:  new               
 Priority:  major                            |      Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component:  Tor                              |        Version:                    
 Keywords:  tor-hs path-bias needs-proposal  |         Parent:                    
   Points:                                   |   Actualpoints:                    
---------------------------------------------+------------------------------

Comment(by rransom):

 Replying to [comment:4 andrea]:
 > Hmm - virtual circuits still sound like an interesting idea to me, but
 how do we tell the difference between failures where it's sensible to
 retry the same path vs. ones where retrying will always fail, like if one
 of the nodes in the path goes offline and we can't know that, other than
 from the failures of the circuits, until the authorities figure it out and
 it drops out of the consensus?

 It's not just a matter of relays failing; links can fail too, either
 permanently (e.g. due to bozos running relays/bridges on boxes with
 hostile firewalls), semi-transiently (e.g. due to a relay hitting an OS-
 imposed limit on the number of TCP sockets), or transiently (e.g. due to
 adaptive CBT refusing to use a circuit because one of the relays had to
 open a new TLS connection before it could pass on the `CREATE` cell (see
 also #3443); a second circuit built along the same path could easily have
 an acceptable build time).

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9001#comment:5>
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