[tor-bugs] #8776 [EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Changes to default ruleset state need to work even if the rule was previously present

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki blackhole at torproject.org
Thu Jul 18 02:07:51 UTC 2013


#8776: Changes to default ruleset state need to work even if the rule was
previously present
----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
 Reporter:  pde                   |          Owner:  micahlee       
     Type:  defect                |         Status:  assigned       
 Priority:  critical              |      Milestone:  HTTPS-E 4.0dev7
Component:  EFF-HTTPS Everywhere  |        Version:                 
 Keywords:                        |         Parent:  #8774          
   Points:                        |   Actualpoints:                 
----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------

Comment(by micahlee):

 Here's my plan for fixing this. I'm adding a new preference called
 extensions.https_everywhere.rules_checked_version.

 When src/chrome/content/code/HTTPSRules.js gets loaded it will see if the
 value in rules_checked_version is less than the current version of HTTPS
 Everywhere. If so, it will recheck all of the rules and then set
 rules_checked_version to the current HTTPS Everywhere version.

 Here's how I can figure out the current version of HTTPS Everywhere:
 http://stackoverflow.com/questions/1088407/how-can-a-firefox-extension-
 get-its-own-version-number-programmatically

 I don't think it should automatically enable any rules on upgrade, only
 disable them (so that if people had manually disabled broken rules in the
 past they don't need to worry about upgrades re-enabling them). It should
 look at the default_off and platform attributes and, based on those,
 decide if each rule should be disabled.

 This is basically introducing a sort of preference migration system into
 HTTPS Everywhere.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8776#comment:3>
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